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Abstract
We consider an extensive form game to analyze the interdependence between
environmental protection of resources, the activities related with the tourism
and the behavior of a local population. We answer two questions: 1) Suppose
that the central planner invest in tourist activities, has he incentives to do
an aggressive propagandistic campaign to convince the tourist to come for the
country? 2) How good is from the environmental point of view that the local
inhabitants prefer to work in tourist activities? So we analyze the situation
when it’s possible to obtain a sustainable tourism in a country such that the
tourism is the main economic activity.
Resumen
En este trabajo analizamos el comportamiento de una poblaci´ on de un lugar
de inter´ es tur´ ıstico respecto al cuidado de la calidad ambiental o cultural de la
regi´ on. El mantenimiento de dicha calidad, puede ser amenazada por la exce-
siva explotaci´ on de los recursos naturales por parte de la poblaci´ on local, que
v e ne nl aa c t i v i d a dt u r ´ ıstica una posibilidad de incrementar su bienestar y por
los turistas que desean obtener el m´ aximo disfrute de las atracciones del lugar.
Intentamos contestar a dos preguntas, la primera de ellas es: ¿Hasta qu´ e punto
el planiﬁcador central tiene inter´ es en desarrollar una campa˜ na propagand´ ıstica
para aumentar la aﬂuencia de turistas al lugar? La segunda es: ¿Hasta
qu´ e punto es bueno para la preservaci´ on del inter´ es tur´ ıstico de la regi´ on que
los habitantes locales se comprometan con la actividad tur´ ıstica? En deﬁni-
tiva, analizamos la posibilidad de desarrollar la actividad tur´ ıstica como una
actividad sustentable.
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1. Introduction
The tourism as economic activity is a phenomenon that has come acquiring a
growing presence in the international economic dynamics. For many nations
and regions of the world the tourism constitutes one fundamental activity,
generators of income, employment and development. But it’s necessary to
understand the character of the tourist activity and its relations with
the environment, which will permit a harmonious contact between nature and
tourism, such that the ecosystems doesn’t suﬀer alterations where this activity
is developing, and implying to face the present tourist needs without putting
in risk the capacity of the future generations to attend its own needs. In this
sense, Bramwell, B and Lane, B., (1993) mention that the sustainable tourism
is an economic development model conceived to improve the quality of life for
the local community, and to facilitate for the visitor a high-quality experience of
the environment, which both the host community as the visitors depends. The
sustainable tourism is related besides with a cultural aspect: it should protect
the cultural identity of local community, through assuring a relation between
the local community and the tourist.
Followingthis concept of sustainable tourism, in this paper we give through
the game theory a model or explanatory game of the relationships among the
main agents that has interactions in tourist activity. Thus, we present a tourism
game in which a central planner (CP) must to choose between to invest or not
in a tourist country. To invest is a very proﬁtable decision if an important part
of the ﬂux of tourism that will arrive to the country in the high season chooses
to stay for a long time, for instance a month, we denote by 0 <Ithe gross
beneﬁt of this decision in this case. In other case, it is to say if the main part of
this ﬂux choose to stay for a short time, for instance a week, then to invest has
not proﬁts other than those related with environmental protection aspects, we
denote this by EP;w h e r e0<E P<I; and including in this case, the CP can
have immediate ﬁnancial losses, the gross beneﬁces in this case is EP−CF < 0.
Where CF denotes the cost of the investment in infrastructure for a long time
tourist season. The possibility that a large part of tourists choose to stay for a
long time depends strongly on their beliefs about the election done by for the
CP. The tourist has not a priori total information about this election. The
degree of conviction that the tourists have about the politic followed for the
CP is important to their election. We assume that their believes about the CP
election can be raised by means a propagandist campaign developed for the CP,
and then to increase the probability that the most important part of tourists
choose to stay for a long time. We assume that the tourist beliefs that, with a
probability equal to x,0≤ x ≤ 1t h eCP made the investment. To raise these
beliefs has a cost for the central planner, we assume that this cost is linear an
equal to cx. In the case where the CP invests and the tourist came for a long
time the proﬁt is equal to I − cx. And if the tourist came for a short time the
proﬁt of the CP is equal to EP − CF − cx. Observe that not necessarily the
CP is interested in to convince all the possible tourists to come to the country
because depending on c if x is big enough then I − cx < 0.
If the central planner does not invest, and the ﬂux of tourists that arrive
to the country for a long time is big, then the damage environmental can be
important. For the central planner it can be beneﬁcial does not to invest if
he is absolutely sure that the tourists will arrive in their majority for a brief152 Revista de Administraci´ on, Finanzas y Econom´ ıa
stay. In this case the environment damages to would be little and it would
not have losses by the little duration of the tourist season. On the other hand
we assume that there exist local populations that can to choose to work in
activities related with tourism or not. These people know the election made for
the central planner. However they do not know the proportion of tourist that
will arrive in the high season for a long time. If the ﬂux of tourist that arrives
for a long time is important the population prefers to work in tourist activities
the most part of their time of work. This decision has an important roll to
convince to the tourists to stay in the country for a long time. Therefore we
consider an extensive game with perfect recall and imperfect information. For
a characterization of this kind of games and some possible Nash equilibrium see
(Van Damme, E., 1991).
For our purposes this paper has the following parts. In section two we
show a particularly example of a tourism game modeling the situation. Section
three is devoted to analyze the Nash equilibrium of the tourism game. Section
four the repeated game is shown, in which through the time a lost
of the environment exists. Section ﬁve analyzes the discount factor and the
future inside the sustainable tourism. Section six represents a numeric small
example that makes an evaluation of the carried out theory. Finally we give
some conclusions to obtain a good policy of sustainable tourism.
2. The Game
The model of an extensive game with imperfect information allows a player,
when taking an action, to have only partial information about the actions taken
previously. Hence we will model this game as an extensive form game with
perfect recall and imperfect information. In particular, we refer to games in
which at every point player remembers whatever he knew in the past as games
with perfect recall.
According to this there are three players, the central planner (CP), the
tourists (T) and the local inhabitants (L). The central planner chooses in the
root of the tree between two pure strategies, to invest (I)o rn o tt oi n v e s t
(NI). The second information set (denoted by t)h a st w on o d e s( n1 and n2)
and corresponds to the tourists. Tourists believe to stay in their node n1 with
probability x and in the node n2 with probability 1 − x. The node n1 comes
after the election to invest, and n2 comes after the election NI. This means
that the tourist believes that with probability x the CP choose to invest. They
have two pure strategies: stay for a long time (LT)o rf o ras h o r tt i m e( ST).
The thirst player are the local inhabitants, they have two information sets, l1
and l2 either with two nodes, l11 and l12 for the ﬁrst one and the nodes l21,
l22 for the second information set. l11 and l21 came after the decision LT;t h e
nodes l12 and l22 comes after ST. Inhabitants have two pure strategies, to
work full time in activities related with tourism, FT or work only partial time
in these activities PT. A convenient representation of this game is shown in
















































In this game CP carries out the ﬁrst move, choosing I or NI. When the player
T’s turn to move, and when doing so she is not informed whether player CP
choose I or NI is a fact indicated in the ﬁgure by the dotted circle connecting
the ends of the histories after which player T has to move for the second time,
choosing an action LT or ST.T h e r e a l n u m b e r s ( a,t,l) under the terminal
histories are the players’ payoﬀ.
However from the second set of information the game can be represented
by means of two normal form games, one corresponding to the election I and
the other to the election NI, we represented them by the matrices AI and ANI
respectively:


































Where the real numbers ai
hk,i∈{ I,NI},h,k∈{ 1,2} represent the payoﬀ
to the CP corresponding to the diﬀerent strategy proﬁles. Analogously, ti
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and li
hk represent the payoﬀs corresponding to the tourists and inhabitants
respectively. The tourist assign probability x to play the game given by AI and
probability 1 − x to play the game given by ANI.
So, given the strategies (q,1 − q),0 ≤ q ≤ 1a n d( q ,1 − q ),0 ≤ q  ≤ 1
followed for the inhabitants if the central planner did the investment (node l1)
or not (node l2) respectively, the expected value that the tourists assign to the
strategy LT is:
ET(LT/(q,q )) = x[qtI
11 +( 1− q)tI
21]+( 1− x)[q tNI
11 +( 1− q )tNI
21 ]( 2 )
and the corresponding value for the strategy ST is
ET(LST/(q,q
 )) = x[qt
I





12 +( 1− q
 )t
NI
22 ]( 3 )
So, they choose LT ifET(LT/(q,q )) ≥ ET(ST/(q,q )) in other case they choose
ST. It follows that this election depends on the values assigned to x.S o ,t h e





































is the least value of x such that the tourist chooses LT. This value depends, in
his turns, on the values of q and q .
The social planner prefers to do the investment in environmental
preservation and that the tourists come to the country for a long time. He
will do a propagandistic campaign if and only if the cost to obtain the level
of credibility x such that the tourists choose this option, satisfy the inequality



































The symbol Px(LT) represents the probabilitythat the tourist playshisstrategy
LT given that he believe that wit probability x the CP did the investment,
Px(ST)=1−Px(LT) these values could be positives if and only if x = x(q,q )
because only in this case that the tourists follow a mixed strategy make sense.
So the tourists choose LT if and only if they assign a value given by
Px(LT) ≥
cx − qaI
12 +( q − 1)aI
22 + q aNI









22 − (q  − 1)aNI
22 − q aNI
11
+q aNI
12 + q aNI
21
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This means that x must be suﬃciently large like so that the tourists decide to
come for a long time and suﬃciently small like so that the cost of obtain this
value does not surpass the beneﬁts associated with this level of credibility.
On the other hand, tourist prefer goods services, this means that their
decisions also depends on the election done by the settlers.
3. The Nash equilibria of the tourism game
Now we can obtain the values of q,q  and Px(LT) such that the strategy





is a Nash equilibrium. Note that the local inhabitants have complete
information about the decision of the central planner, tourists have incomplete
information about this decision and they make this believes from the
propagandistic campaign developed for the central planner. So this equilibrium
depends on the intensity of the campaign that the central planner be disposed
to do.
The best scenario is that one in which the central planner invest,
the population have an intense participation in the tourist activities, and the
tourists came from a long time. The worst scenario, at least from the
environmental point of view is those where the central planner choose does not
to do the investment, and the tourists came for a long time. It can happen
that the local population decides to work in such strong way in the activities
related to the tourism, that even in case when the central planner does not
make the investment, the tourists have interest in remaining in the place by a
long period. These possibilities can be represented by means of the following
payoﬀs:
Consider for the central planner the following payoﬀs in AI and ANI given
in (1):
aI
11 = I − cx, aI
12 = EP − CF − cx,aI
21 = I − cx,aI
22 = EP − CF − cx,
a
NI







































It is possible to obtain values for q and q  such that the tourists prefer to came
for a long time independently of the value of x,t h i sh a p p e ni fq ≥ ¯ q and q  ≥ ¯ q 
where ¯ q and ¯ q  verify the equation ETx(LT) − ETx(ST)=0 .
This is the case if:
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This means that if the settlers prefer to work hard, then the tourists can obtain
a high level of pleasure independently of the action followed for the central
planner. These are no necessarily good news, because if the central planner
choose does not to invest and the tourists came for the country for a long time
then the environmental can suﬀer damage.
In this case the local population can obtain proﬁts in the short time and
then to improve its social welfare however, this situation can revert in the long
period, because if the central planner does not invest in environmental
protection the welfare of the population can decrease with the lost in
environmental quality.
If the Nash equilibrium has these characteristics, i.e. if q∗ > ¯ q and q
∗ > ¯ q ,
then it is Pareto dominated.
4. The repeated game
When the peoples play a normal form game in a repeated way, such that they
do not know the moment of the end of their interaction, the situation can be
modeled as an inﬁnitely repeated game. In these cases it is possible to support
by means of rational strategies news payoﬀ such that are rationally impossible
to obtain in one shot games or even in inﬁnitely many repeated games. These
games capture the idea that the behavior of each player has eﬀect in the future
behavior of the others, and phenomena like cooperation, revenge, and threats
appear.
Suppose that the losses in environmental protection are related with the
time that the tourists remain in the country, with the quantity of tourists in the
country and with the politic followed by the central planer and the intensity
that local inhabitants choose to work in tourists activities. Suppose that this
interaction between tourists, central planner and local inhabitants is modeled
by means of the before analyzed game (the stage game) which is repeated
(inﬁnitely) in each tourist season. We symbolize the losses in environmental
quality, in time t =0 ,1....by LEi,j,t;i ∈{ I,NI};j ∈{ LT,ST} suppose that
the CP has a discount factor δ. The central planner must now decide how
often invests if the looses in environmental quality must be discounted of his
beneﬁts. For instance consider the strategy s for the central planner, he invests
in time zero, and does not invest again until t = T so, the beneﬁt until T are
represented by:
πCP(s)=( I − cx) − LEI,j,0 −
T−1 
t=1
(δ)tLENI,j,t +( δ)t[(I − cx) − LEI,j,T].
depending on the strategy followed for the tourists. The strategy followed by
the tourist depends on the degree of satisfaction obtained in the country and
this depends on the policy of investment followed by the central planner and
on the degree of participation of the local inhabitants in the tourist activities.
The best response for the central planner, depends on the tourists election and
on his discount factor.A Good Policy of Sustainable Tourism 157
How often the CP, need to invest in environmental protection depends
on the intensity of the tourist activities. In this way, if the planner already
made his election on the strategy of the investment in environmental protection,
it will have to coordinate with the local population so that they develop a
degree of activity coincident with the central objective. The intensive use of
the tourist resources, without a concordant policy of investment, can imply the
deﬁnitive loss of these goods for all future. The degree of activity related to the
tourist activities developed by the local population can be interpreted in terms
of time or prices to that the local inhabitants rent their houses to the tourists.
Corresponding to a each degree of activity, a time destined to let on hire the
houses for the tourists or a diﬀerent rent for the same time.
5. The discounting factor and the future
The models of inﬁnitely repeated games capture a situation in which players
repeatedly engage in a strategy game . In this kind of games it is possible
to obtain as result of a Nash equilibrium strategy high payoﬀs which are not
result of any rational strategy in ﬁnite repeated games. However to support
such outcomes each player must be deterred from deviating by being punished
in the cases when he deviated. In some cases this punishment implies that the
punisher is himself punished by his action, or in some cases when the game
involve public goods as environmental quality, punish can implies losses in the
social welfare so, the CP must be able to implement a politic to convince the
deviant to follows the best social action, with the minimal cost of punishment
possible.
Assume that the discounting factor δ of the CP, is coincident with the
expected discount factor of the whole society. Suppose that local inhabitants
have a discounting factor δl less than the social discount factor (they are
myope). In this case the local inhabitants can have interest in to deviate from
an initial agreement between local inhabitants and the CP on the intensity
of the tourist resource utilization. The CP must to punishes this deviation
for instance decreasing the level x of the propagandistic campaign, in other
case losses on environmental provoked by the intensive utilization of the tourist
resource can be never recovered. For instance, suppose that with the objective
to preserve the natural resource the CP and the local inhabitants to agree in
to do not and intensive utilization of this resources. The CP agree in to invest
in environmental protection and local inhabitant agree in to work in tourist
activity only partially. Suppose that however, in time T the local inhabitant
choose to deviate of this agreement and decide to work full time in tourist
activities. The CP can punish this deviation of the local inhabitant choosing
the action not invest from the time in which the local inhabitants deviate and
for all the future, (this kind of strategy are called a trigger strategy), if and
only if the discounting factor of the local inhabitants is no so small. To see this











If the local inhabitants deviate and chose D =( PT,...,PT,FT,... ) this means
plays the action PT until t = T −1, and FTfor all t ≥ T and the CP punishes158 Revista de Administraci´ on, Finanzas y Econom´ ıa
choosing: PT =( I,...I,I,NI,...) i.e. he plays I until t = T and NI for all













Suppose now that lIijt = lI
ij and lNIijt = lNI
ij : So this action is a punishment










In this case is better for the local inhabitants do not deviate.
However if for to deterred the deviation it is necessary to repeat the
punishment for a long time (like in the case of a trigger strategy) it can imply
big loses in social welfare. Strategies like trigger strategies imply a punitive
action forever, and then to punish can be a non credible threat. Fortunately
there exist convincing strategies no so harsh, such that the necessary time of
the punishment is decreasing with the discount factor of the players. The best
strategies are those that render all possible deviation unproﬁtable, this means
that the strategy implement a perfect subgame equilibrium. Some punitive
strategies are not subgame perfect, because they are supported in no
credible threat. Recall that a strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the δ-discounted inﬁnitely repeated game if and only if no player can gain by
deviating in a single period after any history, see [Osborne, M.J.; Rubinstein,
A.]. This type of strategies implies the best policy of protection of the
environmental quality. So to implement a strategy coincident with a subgame
perfect equilibrium is a true challenge for the CP, and it is a problem of
interest when some player are myope, this type of player can obtain proﬁts in
the short time that are opposite to the social welfare, so is the social interest
to deterred this deviation. To do this the CP, would be able to ﬁnd a strategy
such that punishes the deviant in each time, such that it implies
the minimal environmental damage possible. The result of this strategy must
be the socially wished result. The perfect folk theorem shows that if the
discounting factor of the players is not very small, it is possible to build an
strategy such that the equilibrium path consists of the repetition of a single
(strictly) enforceable outcome, and the punishment to the deviant is not to
harsh like the trigger strategy, it is enough to punish only for a ﬁnite number
of periods, so the environmental damage is the minimal possible. In these
cases the threat is credible. In terms of our problem the central planer can
punish a myope behavior of the local population decreasing the investment in
propagandistic campaign, this means social losses because the ﬂux of tourists
that arrive to the country decreases, but is better en terms of environmental
protection if previously the central planner does not did the suﬃcient investment
in environmental protection.
In terms of the folk theorems this means that, if there exists a 0 <δ<1,
such that 1 >δ>δ ,w h e r eδ is the discounting factor of the local inhabitants,
then for each collection of strictly enforceable outcomes a∗ there exists anA Good Policy of Sustainable Tourism 159
strategy that is a perfect Nash equilibrium, such that the generates the path
at = a∗ for all t, (Osborne, M.J.; Rubinstein, A.). This strategy is supported
by the possibility that have the central planner to punish the local inhabitants
if they look for a possible immediate proﬁt and they think to deviate.
6. A numerical example
In this section we show an illustration of the theory by means of a numeric brief
example that will correspond to give the results in that CP really makes the
investment, this is, the corresponding value of x, this is between zero and one,
so we generates a coherent such numeric matrix of payments. Considering the









With these payments, we obtain the probabilities with which a worker
decides to work full time in tourist activities, this is:


























The value of ¯ q means that workers will be in charge of full time in tourist
activities with a biggerprobability or equal to 1/3 if there is a tourist investment
policy that it has carried out by the central planner. But when it didn’t have
the investment, with a probability of 1/2 the workers will be in charge of full
time in tourist activities.
On the other hand, as we saw in section 2, the tourists play to take
vacations for a long time if and only if x ≥ x(q,q ), this way considering (4)
of the section 2 and with the obtained values ¯ q and ¯ q ,w ec a n
obtain the probability that the tourists assign to that central planner decides
to invest, this is x(¯ q, ¯ q )=0 .22 so they play its strategy LT. Also considering
(7), the probability that the tourists play LT since they believe with probability
x(¯ q,¯ q )=0 .22 that CP made the investment is Px(LT)=0.22c−2
7 . It will
depend on the costs incurred in the propagandistic campaign. In this numerical
example, the costs of the propagandistic campaign, c, will be bigger at 10 and
smaller than 45, this way, the value of x assures that the tourists choose to make
vacations for a long season. Also, this conﬁrms that while a propagandistic
campaign of tourism is high then CP has security that tourists arrive for a long
period, if c ≈ 45 this implies that Px(LT) ≈ 1.
On the other hand, to sustain the agreement, explained in section 5,
between CP and the local inhabitants on to invest and to work partially160 Revista de Administraci´ on, Finanzas y Econom´ ıa
respectively, CP can punish the deviation that the local inhabitants carries out








2, that which implies
that the better for the local inhabitants is not to deviate.
7. Conclusions
The Game Theory is a suitable tool to analyze the utilization of tourist
resources, because this utilization is made by diﬀerent human groups with
interest in conﬂict, and the result of this joint activity depends on the behavior
of each one, but no one has the control of the conﬂictive situation.
In some cases an excessive utilization of natural resources can be the result
of the behavior followed for tourist and local inhabitants, but this behavior
can be myope, in the sense that the exhaustion of the natural resource implies
future and irreparable looses in social welfare. Game theory shows that the
central planner can prevent this situation and to avoid it choosing a rational
strategy which implies a credible threat, in this case do not make publicity on
the advantages of the place for the tourists. So in each season for the local
inhabitants is proﬁtable to dedicate a part of their time in other activities, so
this combination of strategies entails a diminution of the tourist ﬂow. The
possibility of obtain this social optima as a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium
is a conclusion of the folk theorem see Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991).
We have analyzed the interdependency between the decisions that take the
main agents of a tourist community. The best situationis given when the central
planner invests in an environmental protection policy, the tourists arrive for a
long time (for example a month of holidays), and the settlers participate in the
tourist economic activity. Therefore, we show that the best response for each
player (CP,T,L) oﬀers a result as Nash equilibrium that is presented under the
perspective of a sustainable tourism, so, it is the best aggregate response in a
tourist country.
The central planner, by means of an environmental protection
policy, should assure in the tourism a planning and to negotiate of sustainable
form, with owed consideration to the protection and adequate economic use of
the social and natural environment for the reception zones. The investment
should have solid information, studies and diverse opinions on the tourism
nature and its eﬀects in the cultural and human traditions before and
during the development, especially as for the local population, so that this
can participate and to inﬂuence in the development direction and alleviate
its eﬀects more harmful so much in own as collective interest. It should be
stimulated to the local population and should be expected that her take the
initiative in planning and development with the aid of government, ﬁrms and
other next ﬁnancial interests. They should be carried out economic, social,
and environmental analysis integrated, doing emphasis in the diﬀerent types of
tourist development and in the forms in which these types would be able to
insert with the ways of traditional life and the environmental factors. The key
of a sustainable tourism is to negotiate with eﬃcacy the cultural and natural
approach, with the object of contributing beneﬁts to the society and to increase
the interest of the visitors.A Good Policy of Sustainable Tourism 161
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